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CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS
THE TOTAL SA. CASE: MEANING OF "INVESTMENT" UNDER THE ILSA
I. INTRODUCTION
On March 7, 1995, Conoco oil company of Houston, Texas, announced that it had
entered into a contract with Iran to have a Netherlands-based affiliate assist in the
development of the Sirri Island oil field.' In response, the Clinton administration issued
Executive Order No. 12,957, prohibiting participation by U.S. entities in the development
of Iranian petroleum resources. 2 Eventually, Conoco withdrew from its contract,3 but in
early May of 1995 the administration stepped up its pressure on Iran by issuing Executive
Order No. 12,959, prohibiting U.S. entities from using foreign entities they owned or
controlled to make investments in or conduct trade transactions with Iran.4 On July 13
of that year, the French oil company Total SA. entered into an agreement with Iran to
replace Conoco in developing the Sixri Island field,5 and over the next several months
Iran struck nearly a dozen petroleum development agreements worth in excess of $50
million each with other foreign oil companies. 6 Within a couple of months, both Houses
of the U.S. Congress took up consideration of proposals to complicate Iran's ability to
develop its hydrocarbon resources.7 By the end of 1995, the proposals, which even
extended to wholly foreign entities organized and operating outside the United States,
had come to include Libya as well.8 Final passage of one of the proposals, specifically,
H.R 3107, took place in the Senate and the House in July 1996.9 It was signed into law
as the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) on August 5.10
1 See Agis Salpukas, Iran Signs Oil Deal With Conoco: First Since 1980 Break With U.S., N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 7, 1995,
at Al.
2 See 60 Fed. Reg. 14,615 (Mar. 17, 1995).
See DouglasJehl, Oil Concern Ends Deal With Iran as President Acts, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 1995, at Al (contract
was contingent on approval of Conoco's board, which insisted that the U.S. Government have no objections
to proceeding).
4 See 60 Fed. Reg. 24,757 (May 9, 1995) (prohibiting U.S. goods, technology or services from being directly
or indirectly supplied to Iran; and prohibiting U.S. persons from dealing in Iranian goods, or from approving,
facilitating or financing any owned or controlled foreign entity's engagement in conduct prohibited to U.S.
persons). For regulations implementing Executive Order Nos. 12,957 and 12,959 in regard to Iran, see 31
C.F.R. §560, especially §560.204, .207, .209 (1997).
See Iranian Negotiations, N.Y. T aEs, Apr. 28, 1995, at D5 (announcement by Iran of negotiations with Total
and Royal Dutch Shell to develop Sirri Island field abandoned by Conoco); Shell Decides Not to Develop Iran
Oilfields, N.Y. TMES, July 4, 1995, at 46 (Royal Dutch Shell withdraws, leaving only Total).
"See H.R REP. No. 104-523(I) (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1296, 1299.
7 On the Senate side, S. 1228, 104th Cong., was introduced by Senator Alfonse D'Amato on September 8,
1995. On the House side, the initial proposal was H.R. 2458, 104th Cong., introduced by Congressman
Benjamin A. Gilman on October 12, 1995. D'Amato's proposal was adopted by the Senate on December 20,
1995. Gilman's initial proposal was replaced on March 19, 1996, by his H.R. 3107, 104th Cong. After delibera-
tion and amendment, the House passed H.R. 3107 on June 19, 1996.
'See S. 1228 (as passed by Senate), §11, 104th Cong.; H.R. 3107 (as passed by House), 104th Cong., titled
"Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996."
"See 142 CONG. REc. S7917 (passage in Senate, July 16, 1996); 142 CONG. REc. H8125-27, H8245 (passage
in House and enrollment, July 23, 1996).
"'i See Pub. L. No. 104-172, 110 Stat. 1541 (1996) [hereinafter ILSA]. It should be noted that, because the
Senate acted first to adopt proposed legislation and then amended H.R. 3107, the bill that was ultimately
adopted, the legislation signed into law by the President, is often referred to as the D'Amato Act.
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The ILSA contains several interesting provisions," perhaps none more so than its
prohibition on "investment[s]. ' ' 12 Since Iran holds the world's second largest reserves
of natural gas, 3 the interest of international oil and gas companies in making investments
in hydrocarbon development in that country is obvious. This interest, in conjunction
with the earlier success of Total Sa.A in replacing Conoco in exploiting the Sirri Island
field, undoubtedly contributed to the French oil company's striking a $2 billion deal
with Iran on September 28, 1997, to develop natural gas reserves in the offshore South
Pars field.' 4 That transaction precipitated immediate debate within the Clinton adminis-
tration about the imposition of sanctions under the ILSA' 5 against Total and the other
companies involved.' 6 While at the time this commentary was written, it was not yet clear
if the deal involving Total met the threshold requirement of an "investment" essential
to trigger sanctions, the case provides an ideal opportunity to examine the precise
bounds of that concept.
Virtually all the debate regarding the contract between Total and Iran has revolved
around the pros and cons of extraterritorial application of U.S. law.17 In some respects,
this is but a continuation of a long-standing European and American controversy, re-
newed most recently in the context of the Helms-Burton legislation.'" Another problem-
atical matter, the meaning of the term "investment" as used in the ILSA's basic sanctions
provision, section 5, is addressed here. My inquiry suggests that the term "investment"
raises questions about two sorts of legal commitments connected with Iran: contracts
to provide services to the oil and gas industry, and petroleum resource development
agreements. Each of these will be taken up in turn. I will focus on whether either of
these basic forms of commitment, or any agreement to provide financing for them, falls
within the ambit of an investment subject to sanctions. Especial reference to section
14(9) of the Act, which defines "investment," will be required.
With respect to service contracts, part II of this commentary contends that the language
of the ILSA is fraught with ambiguity. The relationships between the term "investment"
" Essentially, as regards Iran, it requires the President to impose sanctions, ranging from denial of Export-
Import Bank privileges to limitations on rights of export and import, see id. §§5(a), 6(1)-(6), whenever the
President determines that an investment has occurred that "significantly contributed to the enhancement of
Iran's ability to develop [its] petroleum resources," id. It defines "develop" as including a variety of activities
from exploration to transportation by pipeline, id. §14(4). Sanctions need not be imposed in certain excep-
tional cases, id. §5(0, or in the event that the President exercises the Act's waiver authority, which is based on
pursuit of the U.S. national interest, id. §9(c) (1). Authority also exists for choosing to handle the objectionable
investment through multilateral means, but only when a country with jurisdiction over the offending party is
willing to impose measures inhibiting the transaction with Iran, id. §4(c). Sanctions can also be delayed under
the Act to allow the President to attempt to get another nation vested with jurisdiction to end an objectionable
investment, id. §9(a).
12 See ILSA, supra note 10, §5.
'sSee Youssef M. Ibrahim, Energy Industry Lured by Vast GulfDeposits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1997. at Ag.
'
4 See Roger Cohen, France Scoffs at U.S. Protest over Iran Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1997, at Al.
For early French objections, see Youssef M. Ibrahim, French Oil Official Asks if U.S. Law Reaches Iran, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 6, 1997, at A6. For debate within the Clinton administration, see Gazprom Withdraws fiom Agreement
with Ex-Im Bank Following Hill Criticism, 14 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 2241 (Dec. 24, 1997); U.S., France to Hold
New Talks on Iran Investment Deal Official Says, 15 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 18 (Jan. 18, 1998); EU, United States
Remain Upbeat After Failing to Agree on Cuba, Iran-Libya, id. at 186 (Feb. 4, 1998); Bhushan Bahree & Thomas
Kamm, Total Seeks More Pacts With Iran, Despite U.S., WALL ST. J., Mar. 17, 1998, at A13.
1 See Craig R. Whitney, New U.S. Envoy to Paris Ponders His Stormy Star, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 1997, at A3
(indicating that the Russian company Gazprom and the Malaysian state-owned company Petronas were partici-
pating with Total S.A.).
17 See, e.g., 14 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1735 (Oct. 8, 1997) (EU Trade Commissioner Sir Leon Brittan asking
United States to acknowledge Total's right to invest under international law).
" For the ongoing dispute regarding Helms-Burton, see Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Congress and Cuba: The Helms-
Burton Act, 90 AJIL 419 (1996); Brice M. Clagett, Title 1I of the HelmsBurton Act Is Consistent with International
Law, id. at 434; Peter Glossop, Recent US Trade Restridction Affecting Cuba, Iran and Libya-a View from Outside the
US, 15 J. ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES L. 212 (1997). For one perspective on the history of U.S. economic
sanctions generally, see William Fox, United States and Economic Sanctions: One American Perspective, id. at 387.
For the European response to both Helms-Burton and the ILSA, see Bruno Cova, The European Response to
U.S. Extraterritorial Legislation, 10 OIL & GAs L. & TAX'N Rav. 353 (1997).
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in section 14(9) and other provisions of the Act suggest that service contracts involving
a hands-on part in actually getting petroleum from the ground to market can be argued
as within the reach of the Act. Nonetheless, there is reason to believe that Congress may
have intended service contracts of all sorts to fall outside the Act. However, undertakings
simply to provide the financial backing to support service contracts are not affected by
the Act. With respect to petroleum resource development agreements, part III argues
that the basic development agreement itself clearly lies within the direct aim of what
the Act targets as subject to sanctions. On financing development agreements, and
various circuitous methods of participating in the benefits incident to development
agreements, the ILSA seems to be slightly less clear. The best available evidence, though,
strongly suggests that financing falls outside what the Act punishes, just as with service
contracts. The evidence also provides solid support for excepting from sanctions one
who is guilty of nothing more than an ownership or control connection with another
entity violating the Act. Though it is somewhat uncertain, the direction by one company
to a subsidiary or affiliate to make an "investment" inappropriate under the ILSA
appears to trigger the potential for sanctions on both the acting and the directing
entities.
II. ARE OIL FIELD SERVICE CONTRACTS SuBJEgr TO SANCTIONS?
Senice Contracts
The last sentence of section 14(9) of the ILSA, in defining an "investment" subject
to sanctions under section 5, explicitly excludes contracts to sell or purchase "goods,
services, or technology." 19 Subsection 14(9) (A), however, indicates that such an invest-
ment does include contracts of "responsibility for" development of petroleum re-
sources in Iran or Libya, and contracts of "general supervision and guarantee of"
performance of these contracts.20 Explaining the language of that subsection, the
House Ways and Means Committee Report indicates that it was intended to subject to
sanctions contracts for "the provision of managerial services entailing overall responsi-
bility for the development of Iranian or Libyan petroleum resources."' 2' From state-
ments appearing earlier in the Report, it seems clear that section 14(9)'s exclusionary
last sentence was designed to remove from exposure to sanctions all sales of goods and
technology, including sales of items that could aid in the development of petroleum
resources.
22
If the intent was for things like seismographic, drilling and pipeline services to fall
outside the reach of the ILSA, Congress succeeded in putting together a woefully
inadequate and ambiguous statutory configuration. The legislative history quite explic-
itly declares "managerial services" to be included within "investment," yet services
generally are to be excluded, which results in an inconsistency. In many instances,
seismographic, drilling, pipeline and other such services integral to the discovery,
lifting and supply of petroleum can be seen as performed under contracts establishing
the provider's "responsibility for" development of petroleum resources. The contrac-
tual commitment fixes a duty on providers to play their role in getting oil or gas to
market. Thus, an "investment" exists, and it is subject to sanctions in accordance with
the Act.
'' See lISA, supra note 10, §14(9).
See id. §14(9) (A).
' See H.R. REP. No. 104-523(11) (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1311, 1322.
'
2 See id. at 1317 ("the Committee did not believe it was wise to include a requirement in the bill that the
President sanction trade with Iran" and it would be difficult and unworkable to monitor "trade with Iran,
especially in common goods like drill pipe and drill bits").
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Several specific pieces of evidence operate to complicate any congressional objective
of removing all service contracts from the scope of the ILSA. To begin with, subsection
14(9) (A)'s reference to investment as including a contract establishing responsibility for
"development" of petroleum resources is preceded by section 14(4)'s definition of
"development" as the "exploration for, or the extraction, refining, or transportation
by pipeline of, petroleum resources." 23 Thus, seismographic activity, drilling and trans-
portation by pipeline, as well as other services represented by physical or mental involve-
ment in field activities ranging from discovery to supply, could well be seen as constituting
"development." Clearly, legal advice, accounting and personnel services also contribute
to the success or failure of a development effort. But such services do not involve their
provider in exploration, extraction, refining or transportation, and therefore fall outside
the ambit of the Act.
Further, section 5(a) itself, the basic Iran sanctions provision, states that it is targeted
at investments large enough to "directly and significantly contribute to the enhancement
of Iran's ability to develop petroleum resources."24 Legal, accounting and personnel
services, for example, that are provided to an entity involved in a contractual commitment
to help Iran tap its oil and gas deposits undoubtedly "contribute," albeit in a roundabout
way, to that nation's ability to develop petroleum resources. Nonetheless, the require-
ment in section 5(a) that the investment must "directly and significantly" contribute to
the development efforts supports the view that the ILSA permits distinctions to be drawn
between various services. The result is to characterize only those that fail so to contribute
in an immediate and proximate fashion as within the exclusionary language of the last
sentence of section 14(9), and to subject to sanctions as investments all those in which
the provider is involved in the physical or mental activities of discovery, drilling, lifting,
refining or supply.
Finally, rationality itself provides some support for interpreting the term "investment"
so as to encompass activities like seismographic, drilling and pipeline transportation
services. Juxtaposing the Act's blanket exclusion in the last sentence of section 14(9)
and the legislative history's reference to "managerial services" as being included within
the ILSA's coverage reveals the peculiarity of reading the services exclusion as prohibiting
one from doing indirectly (i.e., through managing another) what one is permitted to
do directly (i.e., through actually performing the service). What sensible enterprise
would contract to provide what is prohibited, that is, to oversee another's provision of
services, when it has the option of providing the service itself?. Admittedly, because the
reference to "managerial services" is followed immediately by the words "entailing
overall responsibility, ' 25 there might be some inclination to regard the reference as
dealing only with the service of managing the entire development project. Militating
against this inclination, however, are the more segmented view of a resource project
reflected in the Act's definition of "development" 26 and the logical outcome that if a
prohibition applies only to supervision of an entire project, it will simply be broken into
separate parts.
Financing of Service Contracts
In view of the openings for argument left by Congress as regards the inclusion of oil
field service contracts within the sanctions provisions of the ILSA, how has it addressed
contracts for financing such services? Again, section 14(9) (A) speaks of a covered invest-
ment as a contract that includes "responsibility for" petroleum development.27 Is it
' See ILSA, supra note 10, §14(4).2 4See id. §5(a).
See supra note 21 and corresponding text.26 See supra note 23 and corresponding text.
' See supra note 20 and corresponding text.
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conceivable that by underwriting the financial dimension of a contract to provide some-
thing like seismographic services, one engages in conduct subject to sanctions?
As already observed, petroleum "development" is defined to extend to mere explora-
tion.28 Thus, in the event a contract to provide financing can be considered as resulting
in the financier's taking on "responsibility for" development, an investment subject to
sanctions can be said to exist. A more restrictive reading of the concept of "responsibil-
ity" would require one actually to undertake the exploration, extraction, refining or
supply. Merely providing aid or assistance that allows another to undertake such activity
would be insufficient. Section 6(4) of the Act, however, in its description of the sanctions
available to the President to combat unacceptable investment, speaks of particular mea-
sures that "may be used against a sanctioned person that is a financial institution.
29
The implication is that, if financial institutions are subject to sanctions for conduct in
which they have engaged, perhaps the Act even encompasses conduct in which they
engage on a regular and routine basis-the provision of loans and other financial
services.
Despite the ambiguities inherent in both "responsibility for" and the language just
quoted from section 6(4) of the ILSA, Congress's intent regarding the financing of
contracts to provide services comes through much more clearly than it does regarding
the inclusion of actual oil field services within the ambit of investment. The last sentence
of section 14(9), which contains the previously discussed broad exclusion for services,
applies that exclusion not only to contracts to sell services, but also to the "financing
of a contract" to sell them. On the narrow issue of how financing is treated, what
prevents this rather explicit language from being confused by other relevant language
in the Act is the legislative history leading to its adoption.
H.R1 3107, the bill that was eventually enacted as the ILSA, provided, as originally
introduced, that "investment" included contracts to finance development of petroleum
resources. s0 It also defined "development" as meaning exploration, as well as extraction,
refining and transportation by pipeline, presaging the definition employed by the ILSA.Y
When the bill was taken up by the House Ways and Means Committee, the language of
inclusion for financing was completely removed and replaced by the exclusionary lan-
guage now appearing in the last sentence of section 14(9) of the Act.32 Though nothing
is said in the Ways and Means Committee Report about the motivation underpinning
the change, s it is apparent that the committee considered the amended version it was
reporting to the full House as not covering financing for, at least, sales of services or
goods and technology.34 Given Congress's intent to have the Act leave aside the financing
of oil field service contracts, the reference in section 6(4) of the ILSA to punitive
measures taken against "a person that is a financial institution" must signify that certain
other types of conduct engaged in by a financial institution can be subject to sanctions.35
However, actions to underwrite the economic side of something like a seismographic
services contract are not included.
See supra notes 23-24 and corresponding text.
z' See ILSA, supra note 10, §6(4).
"' See H.R. 3107 (Mar. 19, 1996), supra note 7, §13(10) (D) (i).
.' See id. §13(5).
"See H.R 3107, 104th Cong. (as adopted by the Ways and Means Comm., June 14, 1996), §14(9), last
sentence.
"See H.R. REP. No. 104-523(11), supra note 21.
. See, e.g., id. at 1317 (describing "investment" under §5 of the Act as "not deal[ing] with financing or
trade"; and the definition of "investment" under §14 as not subjecting "the entry into, performance of, or
financing of contracts to sell or purchase goods, services, or technology" to the strictures of the legislation).
On whether financing the natural resource development agreement itself is considered a covered "invest-
ment," see part III of this commentary infra.
'- See infra note 43 and corresponding text
1998]
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Ill. ARE RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENTS SUBJECT TO SANCTIONS?
Financing of Development Agreements
The foundation from which any oil field service contract springs is the development
agreement, be it a concession, ajoint operating agreement, a production-sharing agree-
ment, a buy-back agreement, or some other variant that allocates shares of the manage-
ment, work or profits between the international operator and the host country. In
keeping with the fact that a contract to finance an oil field service agreement has just
been characterized as falling beyond the reach of the ILSA's notion of an "investment"
subject to sanctions, it may be appropriate to begin the present discussion with some
observations about the Act's treatment of contracts to finance the natural resource
development agreement. On that score, financing provided to an enterprise that has
entered into a natural resource agreement with Iran or Libya is qualitatively different
from financing to one that merely performs an oil field service. The former -places the
financier in the position of underwriting an entity with a claim to the oil or gas, or
profits therefrom, that may be produced. The latter, however, involves support for one
that may have no such claim. In view of that distinction, it is understandably tempting
to read the exclusion in the last sentence of section 14(9) of the Act as one that does
not extend to the financing of the basic underlying development agreement.
There can be no doubt that some slight ambiguity exists regarding contracts financing
the natural resource development agreement itself. Congress cast section 14(9)'s exclu-
sion of financing in terms of financing for goods, services or technology." Nothing
is said about financing for the foundational agreement upon which other financing
agreements rest. Further, the exclusion in section 14(9) found its way there, as indicated
previously,3 7 by virtue of an amendment deleting language that defined a contract to
finance the development of petroleum resources as an investment subject to sanctions.
Is the implication from this that Congress considered it permissible to finance all things,
irrespective of the limited wording of the exclusion, or only those things expressly
enumerated?
The hearings held by the Subcommittee on International Trade of the House Ways
and Means Committee, in conjunction with the deliberations that resulted in the removal
from H.R. 3107 of the language defining financing as "investment," provide insight
into the change. At those hearings, officials from the Office of the U.S. Trade Representa-
tive and the Department of the Treasury made known their view that it was inadvisable
to include financing operations within the notion of investment.38 No opposition to this
view was expressed by the members of the subcommittee. Then, when the amended
version containing the narrowly drawn exclusion referencing only goods, services and
technology was taken up by the full House, the principal sponsors of the legislation made
several statements indicating that financing would not be covered bywhat ultimately went
on to become the ILSA. 9 Indeed, at one juncture during the floor debate preceding
the House's passage of the legislation, Congressman Sam Gejdenson, of Connecticut,
indicated that he had personally sent letters to "banks and economic entities in the G-
7 countries" informing them that, while the amended version of the legislation reported
to the full House no longer defined "investment" as including financing, Congress
would closely monitor the lending practices of such institutions and might respond with
additional legislation if abuses developed.40 Again, no objection was expressed. Further,
'6 See ELSA, supra note 10, §14(9), last sentence.
s See supra notes 32-34 and corresponding text.
"See Iran and Libya Sanctions: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Trade of the House Comm. on Ways and Means,
104th Cong. at 7, 12, 26, 31-32 (1996) [hereinafter Hearings].
39 See 142 CONG. REc. H6474, H6476 (1996). For consideration by the full Senate, which is not informative,
see id. at S7908 (Kennedy and D'Amato amendment to H.R. 3107) and S7917.
40 See id. at H6474.
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as no effort was made in either the subcommittee hearings or the floor debate to
distinguish between financing an entire project and financing its separate components,
the implication is that both lie outside the reach of the ILSA, despite the exclusionary
language of the last sentence of section 14(9) mentioning only financing for goods,
services and technology.
41
Development Agreements and Circuitous Methods of Participation
With regard to entering into the natural resource development agreement itself, the
Act is clear in subjecting such conduct to sanctions.4 ' To the extent that oil field service
contracts are in the same position, a certain parallelism thus appears. The work side of
the transaction is considered objectionable, but the financing side is not. The really
intriguing aspect of the development agreement concerns the use of circuitous methods
by entities desirous of participating in an oil and gas development agreement. There
seem to be two categories of circuitous methods available to such entities. The first
involves avoidance of responsibility for directly performing the obligations of a develop-
ment agreement by entering into an agreement to create an ownership interest in, or
right to participate in the proceeds of, another entity's contract to conduct, supervise
or, perhaps, as suggested in part II above, service a natural resource development
agreement. The second involves the establishment of an ownership connection with
another entity that makes a commitment either to conduct, supervise or service a develop-
ment agreement, or to acquire an ownership interest in, or right to share in the proceeds
of, a contract to conduct, supervise or service an agreement to develop oil and gas
resources.
Concerning the first of these two categories, subsections 14(9) (B) and (C) explicitly
provide that the term "investment" includes "[t]he purchase of a share of ownership,
including an equity interest, in [a petroleum resource] development," and "[t]he entry
into a contract providing for the participation in royalties, earnings, or profits in [such
a] development, without regard to the form of the participation." Thus, an entity can
clearly be subject to punishment for entering into any form of understanding that vests
it with a share in the production or profits of a petroleum development project. This
would include, for example, understandings spanning the spectrum from those based
on the acquisition of rights in traditional oil and gas production and profit-sharing
agreements or farm-out agreements, to those taking the form of unconventional, specula-
tive finance arrangements designed to repay and reward, with interests in production or
profits, equity infusions supporting a development agreement. In a sense, the observation
offered about speculative and creative finance arrangements provides some explanation
of why section 6(4) of the Act speaks of financial institutions as being subject to sanc-
tions.43 The idea is not to signify that financing is generally an investment subject to
sanctions. It is rather to acknowledge that financial institutions may occasionally engage
in practices for which the Act provides no tolerance.
Because subsection 14(9) (B) refers to ownership shares as being defined as covered
"investment[s]," including those shares considered to be "equity interest[s]," there
may be some question whether mere stock or bond ownership qualifies as punishable.
Subsection 14(9) (C)'s objection to contracts providing for "participation in. . .profits"
of a development project can be read as supporting this approach, especially since stock
41 It should be observed, though, that during the debate on the House floor about the bill, Congressman
Berman is reported to have asked Congressman Gilman to comment on the meaning of the §14(9) definition
of "investment." In response, Gilman simply indicated that it "is intended to underscore. . . [the absence]
of a trade trigger." See id. at H6476.
41 See ILSA, supra note 10, §14(9) (A).
" See supra note 29, and text at notes 34-35 (indicating that the mention of financial institutions does not
mean the Act contains a general prohibition on financing).
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or bond owners have a right to share in the profits of the entities in question. However,
the reports of both the International Relations Committee and the Ways and Means
Committee of the House of Representatives make it crystal clear that the intent of the
statute is not to characterize what might be described as "portfolio investment" in an
entity engaged in punishable activity as conduct that can itself be penalized under the
ILSA.44 Purchasing a share in another entity's development agreement and acquiring an
interest in a contract providing for a right to participate in the rewards of a development
agreement are both punishable activities. Simply holding equity or debt interests for
income purposes, though, falls beyond the reach of the sanctions provisions of the Act.
As for the second category of circuitous investment methods, that involving the use
of intermediaries, reference to section 5(c) is imperative. It must be observed that
section 5(c) applies across the board and not just to the foundational natural resource
development agreement. That is to say, the section applies to any activity considered an
investment. It identifies the persons subject to sanctions under the IISA. In not confining
itself to U.S. entities, it serves as the basis for all the disputes about extraterritoriality.
Those within its reach include both entities that have made a punishable investment,
and any successor, or "parent or subsidiary" with actual knowledge of the objectionable
conduct, or "affiliate" with such knowledge, if that affiliate is controlled by the entity
that made the investment.
45
Clearly, section 5(c) contains no limit on imposing sanctions on those who actually
make, or succeed those who make, an objectionable investment. The references to
"parent or subsidiary" and "affiliate" suggest an awareness of the fact that, through
ownership-layering or control-layering strategies, entities may seek to sidestep the ILSA's
restrictions. This inference should not be taken as implying that a punishable investment
entered into by one entity necessarily subjects to sanctions a parent or subsidiary, or a
controlled affiliate, with actual knowledge of the investment. Subsections 5 (c) (2) (B)
and (C) plainly indicate that, before a parent, subsidiary or controlled affiliate can be
penalized, they themselves must "have engaged in" some sort of inappropriate invest-
ment. A mere ownership connection with another entity, even when accompanied by
knowledge of the other entity's objectionable activity, is insufficient to impute culpability
entailing sanctions to one that is not itself engaged in an investment considered inappro-
priate. Parents cannot be penalized for the acts of controlled subsidiaries or affiliates
simply because control is coupled with knowledge.
As originally introduced, H.R. 3107 took a broader approach and permitted sanctions
against parents for the actions of subsidiaries and affiliates without requiring more than
ownership or control and knowledge.46 Objections led the Ways and Means Committee
to report the current language to the full House for adoption.47 Though it is not entirely
clear, in view of the provision of sanctions under subsection 5(c) (2) (B), when parents
know of their subsidiaries' investments and have themselves "engaged in the activities"
of investment, there seems to be good reason to believe that the Act reaches situations
in which subsidiaries are used to engage in activity parents wish to avoid.48 The implica-
44 See H.R. REP. No. 104-523(I), supra note 6, at 1303 (International Relations Comm.); H.R. REP. No. 104-
523(11), supra note 21, at 1318 (Ways and Means Comm.).
41 See USA, supra note 10, §5(c) (2) (C), speaking of "controlled in fact," which is left undefined.
46 SeeH.R. 3107 (Mar. 19,1996), supranote 7, §4(b) (4)- (6). Parentswere liable if they had "actual knowledge
or had reason to know" of objectionable investment activities. Wholly owned subsidiaries were fully liable for
the investments of those who owned them. Other subsidiaries and affiliates were liable if, with knowledge or
reason to know, they had "engaged in activities which were the basis of [a] determination" of investment.
47 For the objections to the original version on grounds of one entity's being subject to punishment for
conduct of an associated entity, see Heafings, supranote 38, at 7, 13, 21, 30-31. The version of the bill reported
by the Ways and Means Committee to the full House substituted what appears in subsections 5(c) (2) (B) and
(C) for the objectionable language in the original bill. See H.R. 3107, supra note 32, §5(c) (2) (B) & (C).
4See H.R. REP. No. 104-523(11), supra note 21, at 1317 (indicating that "purchases or equity interests in a
non-Iranian company subject to [§14 and sanctions]" is permissible, "unless the purchasing party is covered
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tion seems to be that parents, by knowingly pursuing objectionable activity through their
subsidiaries, evidence fault that can bring sanctions on themselves. Being "engaged in
the activities" the ILSA punishes encompasses the use of an agent to perform objection-
able activity that the principal fears to perform directly.
IV. CONSIDERATIONS RELEVANT TO DECISION REGARDING TOTAL S.A.
The complexities associated with the ILSA's use of the term "investment" will provide
lawyers representing businesses interested in ventures in Iran with interpretive chal-
lenges. The French oil company Total S.A. may incur sanctions under the Act for assis-
tance it has contracted to provide in the development of Iran's South Pars gas field.
The precise nature of Total's commitment will prove instrumental in that regard. In
view of the ILSA's waiver provisions, however, the international considerations sur-
rounding the episode may be even more important. To conclude this commentary, I
offer some brief reflections on three considerations relevant to the ultimate decision.
The first concerns the irritation sanctions might provoke in European allies. Innumera-
ble sources of discomfiture can already be found in U.S.-European trade relations. These
range from growth hormones in beef, to divergent approaches on bribery in international
business transactions, to import and investment restrictions designed to protect cultural
industries.49 While sanctions under extraterritorially applied U.S. law are likely to add a
further complication, a variety of natural affinities suggest the impossibility of any rupture
in relations. Nonetheless, given the demise of bipolarity, the Europeans may feel easier
about voicing their true sentiments concerning what might be seen as American abuse
of an unrivaled political dominance. Such statements could open cracks that opportunists
among rogue nations might seek to exploit. The end result could be increased difficulty
in establishing a U.S.-European consensus on how sensitive world problems should be
addressed, both now and in the future.
Second, there is the matter of U.S.-Iranian relations. The recent overture by Iran's
President Mohammad Khatami5 ° might be a shrewd deception aimed at gaining a steady
inflow of capital for hydrocarbon development so that weapons programs and terrorist
activities can continue to be funded. Conversely, it might reflect a plea for a responsive
gesture that would strengthen the hand of Islamic moderates in their struggle against
the reactionary clerics who have long exerted control over all aspects of political and
civic life. In either case, sight should not be lost of the fact that, for nearly twenty
years, U.S.-imposed economic isolation has failed to stem the tide of Iranian-sponsored
fundamentalist terrorism or discourage investment by foreign entrepreneurs in Iranian
business ventures. All along, however, principle has been pursued at the expense of
American enterprises and financiers. Given Khatami's recent overture, perhaps the time
has come for the United States to switch to a policy of "engagement" with Iran and
away from that of "dual containment," which has focused on isolating Iran as well as
by Section 5(c) (2) (B) of the bill which deals with parent-subsidiary relationships"). The implication is that
one cannot escape the limitations of the Act by using a subsidiary to accomplish investment the parent refrains
from making. Sanctions can be imposed on the subsidiary and the parent if the parent had knowledge and
is found to have "engaged in the activities" of investment.
" See e.g., EC-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), Complaint by the United
States, WTO Doc. WT/DS26/R/USA (Aug. 18, 1997) (panel report); EC Plans to Ban U.S. Beef Exports Due to
Hormone, Antibiotic Residues, 14 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 2210 (Dec. 24, 1997); U.S., Europe at Loggerheads over
Talks to End Brbery in International Transactions, id. at 1985 (Nov. 19, 1997); Rex J. Zedalis, Internationalizing
Prohibitions on Foreign Corrupt Practices: The OAS Convention and the OECD Revised Recommendation, J. WORLD
TRADE, Dec. 1997, at 45; Debate on Exceptions, Labor Issues Heats up at OECD Investment Talks, 14 Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) 2218, 2219 (Dec. 24, 1997) (noting France leading charge at talks on multilateral agreement on
investment to include exception to protect cultural industries, just as it had done during Uruguay Round
WTO talks).
-", See A Soft Signal From Iran, NEWSWEK, Jan. 19, 1998, at 30; Elaine Sciolino, Seeking to Open a Door to US.,
Iranian Proposes Cultural Ties, N.Y. Tims, Jan. 8, 1998, at Al.
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Iraq. Though reinitiating relations with Iran might provide but a modicum of leverage
over its objectionable activity, it could well intensify the pressure on Iraq's Saddam
Hussein and thus increase his pliancy on a variety of fronts.
The third consideration relevant to the ultimate decision about sanctions against Total
is that of linkage. An improvement in relations between the United States and Iran
sufficient to rule out sanctions could temper Iran's reaction to the Mideast peace process.
Since a wide variety of problems throughout the Persian Gulf region seem related to
the pace and direction of that process, any moderation in that respect could prove
helpful. But even apart from that, a policy directed at removing obstacles to the develop-
ment of the natural gas resources in Iran could provide a mechanism for alleviating
global climate change. Currently, the United States, the European Community, Japan,
and the twenty-six other members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development are responsible for approximately 50 percent of the world's anthropogenic
emissions of carbon dioxide,5 ' the most important greenhouse gas. By the year 2010,
because of their reliance on coal, which produces several times as much carbon dioxide
as does natural gas, India and China are expected to be the world's two biggest polluters,
accounting for 20 percent of total carbon dioxide emissions.5 2 Only Pakistan separates
Iran from India. Therefore, a modus vivendi conditioning a new attitude toward oil and
gas investment on a commitment to establish a pipeline connecting consumers in India
with suppliers in Iran could prove immensely valuable.
In each case in which an "investment" under the ILSA is determined to exist, the
potential for the imposition of sanctions is present. Whether Total's contractual commit-
ment to Iran of September 28, 1997, will result in sanctions involves reflection on many
complex and delicate matters. Future instances in which the Act is involved will raise
considerations of comparable difficulty. In the end, policy makers can never be certain
that the action they choose will be well-advised. Each occasion, however, demands reflec-
tion on the broadest range of possibly relevant factors.
RExJ. ZEDALIS*
THE SIXTH SESSION OF THE UN PREPARATORY COMMITTEE ON THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
The Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court
(Preparatory Committee or committee) held its sixth and final session from March 16
to April 3, 1998, at the United Nations headquarters in New York.1 At this session it
completed its work of preparing a consolidated text of a statute for a permanent interna-
tional criminal court (ICC) for adoption at a diplomatic conference in Rome held from
June 15 to July 17, 1998.2 The consolidated text is considerably longer than the draft
statute submitted by the International Law Commission to the UN General Assembly in
51 See INTERNAIONAL ENERGYAGENcY, WoRLD ENERGY OuTLooK: 1996, at 57-58 (based on 1993 emission
figures).
52See id.
* Professor of Law and Director, Comparative and International Law Center, University of Tulsa.
For an account of the fifth session, see Christopher Keith Hall, TheFifth Session ofthe UNPreparatory Committee
on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, 92 AJIL 331 (1998).
2 Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Part One,
UN Doc. A/CONF.183/2/Add.1 (Apr. 14, 1998). Unless otherwise indicated, all quotations of the statute arc
from this text. The report and almost all the UN documents mentioned in this paper are available on the
Internet site maintained by the NGO Coalition for an International Criminal Court (NGO Coalition) (http://
www.igc.apc.org/icc). The NGO Coalition coordinates the work of more than 800 NGOs around the world.
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